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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge: 
 
Appellant contends that he was convicted of one crime 
but sentenced for another. We agr ee, and will remand for 
resentencing. 
 
I. 
 
Several Deputy U.S. Marshals arrived at an apartment 
complex in West Norriton, Pennsylvania on June 17, 1999 
to arrest Robert McCulligan, who was wanted for a violation 
of supervised release. As McCulligan attempted to drive his 
vehicle out of an entrance to the complex, Deputies 
O'Donnell and Kurtz blocked his path with their vehicle and 
ordered him to stop. McCulligan responded by driving 
rapidly in reverse. The deputies pursued, and the two 
vehicles collided when McCulligan apparently attempted to 
turn around. McCulligan later claimed that the deputies 
rammed his vehicle; the deputies contended McCulligan 
rammed theirs. Either way, the force of the impact locked 
the vehicles' front bumpers together at a r oughly 
perpendicular angle, preventing McCulligan fr om 
proceeding. As the deputies exited their vehicle and Deputy 
O'Donnell moved toward the driver's side door of 
McCulligan's vehicle, however, McCulligan again put his 
vehicle in reverse. Unable to break fr ee, McCulligan's 
vehicle began to fish-tail dangerously as its wheels spun; 
fortunately, it did not strike either deputy. Deputy Kurtz 
approached McCulligan's vehicle, punched out the driver's- 
side window with his hand and gun, and order ed 
McCulligan to stop. McCulligan surrender ed. 
 
McCulligan was charged with assault on Deputies 
O'Donnell and Kurtz under 18 U.S.C. S 111(a), two counts 
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of assault on a federal officer with a deadly or dangerous 
weapon under 18 U.S.C. S 111(b), and destruction of 
government property under 18 U.S.C. S 1361. At trial, the 
government argued that McCulligan purposefully collided 
with the deputies' vehicle and would have seriously injured 
Deputy O'Donnell had his vehicle broken fr ee while fish- 
tailing. The jury, however, found McCulligan guilty only of 
the S 111(a) assault on Deputy O'Donnell and destruction of 
government property, a result which, as the District Court 
remarked, indicated that the jury was "unpersuaded by the 
government's version of the collision." United States v. 
McCulligan, No. 99-410-01, slip op. at 4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 
2000). 
 
At sentencing, McCulligan argued that his actions 
amounted to nothing more than "simple assault" under 
S 111(a), which carries a maximum prison ter m of one year. 
Section 111(a) also provides for three years' imprisonment 
in "all other cases" of assault (hereinafter "non-simple 
assault").1 The District Court found that "the fish-tailing 
movements of defendant's car when O'Donnell was standing 
close by are enough to support an aggravated assault, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. 18 U.S.C. S 111 states: 
 
       (a) In general. Whoever-- 
 
(1) forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or 
interferes 
with any [federal officer] while engaged in or on account of the 
performance of official duties; or 
 
(2) forcibly assaults or intimidates any person who formerly served as a 
[federal officer] on account of the per formance of official duties during 
such person's term of service, 
 
       shall, where the acts in violation of this section constitute only 
       simple assault, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more 
       than one year, or both, and in all other cases, be fined under this 
       title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. 
 
       (b) Enhanced penalty. Whoever, in the commission of any acts 
       described in subsection (a), uses a deadly or danger ous weapon 
       (including a weapon intended to cause death or danger but that 
fails 
       to do so by reason of a defective component) or inflicts bodily 
injury, 
       shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten 
       years, or both. 
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albeit not necessarily with a deadly or danger ous weapon." 
McCulligan, Slip Op. at 13. The District Court then used the 
three-year maximum term from the"all other cases" 
provision in determining McCulligan's sentencing range 
under the Sentencing Guidelines. 
 
McCulligan now appeals the District Court's judgment. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 and 18 U.S.C. 
S 3742(a). We exercise plenary r eview over questions of law 
as well as the District Court's application of the Sentencing 
Guidelines. United States v. Williams, 235 F.3d 858, 861 
(3d Cir. 2000). 
 
II. 
 
The United States Criminal Code describes the two 
crimes at issue -- simple assault and "all other cases" of 
assault -- in a single statutory subsection, 18 U.S.C. 
S 111(a). Under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 
S.Ct. 2348 (2000), the fact that various offenses are 
grouped together or share a particular label is irrelevant. 
Instead, the Apprendi Court held, except for the fact of a 
prior conviction, "any fact that increases the penalty for a 
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a r easonable 
doubt." Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63. The relevant 
inquiry is whether "the required finding expose[s] the 
defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by 
the jury's guilty verdict." Id. at 2365. Because non-simple 
assault carries a greater statutory maximum than simple 
assault, each element of non-simple assault must be 
charged in the indictment and proven to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 
The District Court instructed the jurors that they were to 
find McCulligan guilty upon proof of thr ee elements: (1) 
that he forcibly assaulted the person named in the 
indictment, (2) that the victim was a federal officer, and (3) 
that McCulligan did the acts charged voluntarily and 
intentionally. App. at 768, 771-772. The Court further 
instructed the jury that "forcible assault" means "any 
deliberate and intentional attempt or threat to inflict 
physical injury on another person with force or strength, 
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when the attempt or threat is coupled with an apparent 
present ability to do so . . . A forcible assault may be 
committed by a defendant without actually touching, 
striking or doing bodily harm to the other person . . . ." Id. 
at 768. The government concedes that whatever fact 
separates "all other cases" of assault fr om mere "simple 
assault," the jury was not asked to find it. Appellee's Br. at 
41-42. Any sentence greater than one year on the S 111 
count thus represents error under Apprendi. 
 
Preliminarily, we must respond to the government's 
contention that because McCulligan failed to object to any 
Apprendi error either at trial or during sentencing, we 
review only for plain error. W e surely would not have 
expected McCulligan to object to the "simple assault" jury 
charge at issue in this case; he had no r esponsibility and 
certainly no incentive to point out that the gover nment 
could have attempted to win a conviction on some gr eater 
offense. United States v. Candelario, 240 F.3d 1300, 1305 
(11th Cir. 2001). No error occurr ed from McCulligan's 
perspective until the sentencing stage, when, although not 
explicitly invoking Apprendi, he in fact objected to the 
Court's determination that his offense of conviction was 
something greater than simple assault.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. McCulligan's attorney argued at sentencing that the jury convicted his 
client of simple assault and that he could not be sentenced for anything 
more, as this colloquy illustrates: 
 
       [Counsel]: I don't believe that the Court can impose a sentence of 
       more than one year in this case, that being the statutory 
       maximum of a finding based upon a simple assault. 
       . . . 
 
       The Court: Well, wait a moment. Wasn't there a guilty verdict as to 
       an assault on a federal officer? 
 
       [Counsel]: There was, your honor . 
 
       The Court: And you're saying the maximum statutory sentence is 
       one year? 
 
       [Counsel]: If this Court finds that it was a simple assault as 
       opposed to an aggravated assault it's a one-year 
       maximum, statutory maximum . . . . 
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To preserve the right to appeal a district court ruling, "it 
is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling. . . is made 
or sought, makes known to the court the action which that 
party desires the court to take . . . and the grounds 
therefor." Fed. R. Crim. P. 51. McCulligan did not mention 
Apprendi, but, rather, ar gued that the facts and the jury's 
findings fit the definition of one crime and not another, and 
that he should be sentenced under the correct statutory 
maximum. When one contends that he or she is about to 
be sentenced for a crime of which he or she was not 
convicted -- an error by any standard-- intonation of the 
word "Apprendi" is unnecessary to present the issue 
squarely to the court. In any event, as our analysis below 
will indicate, McCulligan's sentence would not survive 
either harmless error or plain err or review. 
 
The government argues that the District Court's error in 
making a determination that should have gone to the jury 
is not reversible for two reasons. First, the government 
contends that McCulligan's offense of conviction actually 
was non-simple assault despite the jury char ge and that 
the failure to properly instruct the jury was harmless error 
under the Supreme Court's decisions in Johnson v. United 
States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997) and Neder v. United States, 527 
U.S. 1 (1999). Second, the government ar gues that even if 
McCulligan was convicted of the lesser assault crime, the 
District Court's contrary findings of fact at sentencing did 
not implicate Apprendi. Although the Court's finding of 
"aggravated assault" raised McCulligan's sentencing range 
beyond the one-year maximum for his simple assault 
count, the argument goes, his actual sentence did not fall 
outside the ten-year maximum he faced on the destruction 
of government property count. We address each argument 
in turn. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
App. at 798-99; see also App. at 822 (McCulligan's attorney stating once 
again that "the statutory max should be at most one year."). While 
counsel seems to have assumed that it was the Court's duty to make the 
simple/non-simple assault determination rather than the jury's, he was 
clear in stating that the facts pointed to only one resolution. 
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III. 
 
In Neder, the Supreme Court examined whether 
overwhelming evidence of a particular element of an offense 
can compensate for a court's failure to submit that element 
to the jury. The trial court in Neder neglected to instruct 
the jury in a tax fraud prosecution that conviction required 
a finding of material falsehood. The defendant was found 
guilty on the incomplete instructions and appealed. 
Answering a question it left open in Johnson, the Supreme 
Court held that non-structural constitutional err ors, 
including the failure to submit an element of a crime to the 
jury, are subject to harmless err or review. Neder, 527 U.S. 
at 8-15. 
 
By invoking Neder, the government necessarily contends 
that McCulligan was, in fact, "convicted" of non-simple 
assault despite jury instructions that charged simple 
assault. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 15 (framing the question as 
whether a defendant's conviction could "stand" because the 
error was harmless). Confusion over the actual offense of 
conviction seems inevitable where a defendant is charged 
and a jury instructed according to a general statute such 
as S 111(a) that Apprendi since has shown to encompass 
the equivalent of multiple crimes rather than a single crime 
with various sentencing factors. We note that this Court 
has not yet considered whether Neder applies to a situation 
where, unlike in Neder itself, the jury instructions properly 
set out the elements of what is essentially a lesser included 
offense. We need not unsnarl the intersection of Neder and 
Apprendi in the present case, however, because we find no 
evidence that could lead a rational jury to find McCulligan 
guilty of non-simple assault. 
 
Before a conviction may be sustained despite the 
omission of an element from the jury instructions, Neder 
demands a "thorough examination of the r ecord" by the 
reviewing court: 
 
       If, at the end of that examination, the court cannot 
       conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury 
       verdict would have been the same absent the err or -- 
       for example, where the defendant contested the omitted 
       element and raised evidence sufficient to support a 
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       contrary finding -- it should not find the err or 
       harmless. 
 
Neder, 527 U.S. at 19. To make such a determination here, 
we must first examine the distinction between the two types 
of S 111(a) assault, a question of first impression in this 
Court. Once we understand the definition of non-simple 
assault, we must search the record for proof "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" of that more serious offense. 
 
In the federal scheme (at least, post-Appr endi), SS 111(a) 
and 111(b) create three separate of fenses: simple assaults, 
other "non-simple" assaults not involving a dangerous 
weapon or injury, and assaults that involve a danger ous 
weapon or cause injury. See United States v. Nunez, 180 
F.3d 227, 233 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting the three crimes). 
"Simple" assault is not defined, thus leaving the catch-all 
category of "other" assaults similarly without clear 
demarcation. We, therefore, start from the well-established 
proposition that where Congress fails to specifically define 
a term, that term should be interpr eted according to its 
common law definition. Moskal v. United States , 498 U.S. 
103, 114 (1990); United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411 
(1957). If research into the common law yields several 
competing definitions, courts should look to the r eading 
that "best accords with the overall purposes of the statute" 
even if it is the minority view. Moskal, 498 U.S. at 116-17. 
Furthermore, "Congress' general purpose in enacting a law 
may prevail over this rule of statutory construction," id. at 
117, and a more "generic, contemporary" definition may 
apply where the traditional definition is out of step with 
modern criminal justice policy. Taylor v. United States, 495 
U.S. 575, 598 (1990). Regarding the statute at issue here, 
the Supreme Court has also noted that S 111 should be 
construed "to effectuate the congressional purpose of 
according maximum protection to federal officers." United 
States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 684 (1975). 
 
The government states correctly that, at common law, 
there were no degrees of assault or battery. Rather, 
"assault" was defined as the "attempt or offer to beat 
another, without touching him," 3 Blackstone, 
Commentaries at 120, or the "placing of another in 
reasonable apprehension of a battery." United States v. 
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Ramirez, 233 F.3d 318, 321-22 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing 
LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal LawS 7.16 (1986)). 
"Battery" was defined at common law as the unlawful 
beating of another, including "[t]he least touching of 
another's person willfully, or in anger." 3 Blackstone, 
Commentaries at 120. Battery could rise to the crime of 
mayhem where the defendant caused permanent injury. Id. 
at 121. Over time, many jurisdictions have come to use the 
term "assault" to describe both assaults and batteries. 
Rollin M. Perkins and Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 159- 
60 (3d ed. 1982); Black's Law Dictionary 114 (6th ed. 
1990). 
 
In United States v. Chestaro, 197 F .3d 600 (2d Cir. 1999), 
the Second Circuit recognized that the undefined term 
"simple assault" also appears in 18 U.S.C.S 113, "which 
has been held to `embrace the common law meaning of that 
term.' " Chestaro, 197 F .3d at 605 (quoting United States v. 
Stewart, 568 F.2d 501, 504 (6th Cir .1978)); see also United 
States v. Estrada-Fernandez, 150 F .3d 491, 494 n.1 (5th 
Cir. 1998); United States v. Juvenile Male, 930 F.2d 727, 
728 (9th Cir. 1991). Applying case law interpreting S 113 to 
similar language in S 111, the Chestar o Court found that 
"simple assault" is a crime "committed by either a willful 
attempt to inflict injury upon the person of another, or by 
a threat to inflict injury upon the person of another which, 
when coupled with an apparent present ability, causes a 
reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm." Id. at 
605 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 637 F .2d 1224, 
1242 n.26 (9th Cir. 1980)). Expanding further upon this 
definition, the Second Circuit agreed with the government's 
position in that case: 
 
       [F]or practical purposes S 111 cr eates three distinct 
       categories of conduct: (1) simple assault, which, in 
       accord with the common-law definition, does not 
       involve touching; (2) "all other cases," meaning assault 
       that does involve contact but does not r esult in bodily 
       injury or involve a weapon; and (3) assaults r esulting 
       in bodily injury or involving a weapon. We think that 
       this is a reasonable construction of the statute, and 
       one that gives effect to every part of it. 
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Chestaro, 197 F.3d at 606 (emphasis added). The Fifth 
Circuit recently accepted this definition in United States v. 
Ramirez, 233 F.3d 318 (5th Cir . 2000) (" `[A]ll other cases' 
refers to those assaults contemplated by the statute which 
do involve physical contact, but do not involve a deadly 
weapon or bodily injury."). Under the Chestar o scheme, a 
defendant whose conduct did not involve actual contact, a 
weapon, or bodily injury could be convicted only of"simple 
assault" within the structure of S 111.3 
 
The government contends that the findings in Chestaro 
and Ramirez, arguably dicta , were incorrect. As did the 
District Court, the government views "simple assault" 
through the lens of the Model Penal Code ("MPC"). The MPC 
essentially defines "simple assault" as attempting to cause 
or causing injury, and "aggravated assault" as attempting 
to cause or causing serious injury. MPC S 211.1. The 
distinction between these two levels of assault under the 
MPC thus relies not on contact, but on the potential for 
serious injury. The government notes that the MPC is 
widely cited by courts around the country for a variety of 
propositions, including, in a general way in one case, as 
being useful for interpreting S 111. See United States v. 
Duran, 96 F.3d 1495, 1509 (D.C.Cir . 1996) (quoting from 
the MPC with regard to S 111 but not examining the 
question before this Court). 
 
Contrary to the government's urging, we do not find the 
MPC to be an authoritative vehicle for interpr eting simple 
assault and other forms of assault under S 111(a). While 
modern statutes may present evidence of contemporary 
definitions Congress had in mind when crafting S 111, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The government argues that some courts have upheld convictions for 
simple assault in cases that unambiguously included a touching. See, 
e.g., United States v. Bayes, 210 F .3d 64, 69 (1st Cir. 2000) (nonviolent 
but sexually offensive groping can be"simple assault" under S 113(a)(5)); 
United States v. Smith, 812 F.2d 161 (4th Cir. 1987) (upholding 
conviction for simple assault under S 113(a)(5) on facts including a non- 
injurious touching). These cases do not necessarily cut against the 
conclusion in Chestaro. "[T]he fact that the battery is actually committed 
does not result in a merger therein of the assault; proof of a battery 
supports a conviction for assault." United States v. Guilbert, 692 F.2d 
1340, 1343 (11th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted). 
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wording of S 111 does not bear out the pr oposition that its 
drafters envisioned an MPC-like scheme. Congr ess did not 
choose to use language such as "assault" and"more serious 
assault," "assault" and "aggravated assault," or "minor 
assault" and "major assault." Instead, Congress chose the 
terms "simple assault" and "all other" assaults, which seem 
to suggest, if not explicitly refer to, the traditional notion of 
assault as a crime separated from battery accor ding to the 
presence or absence of touching. 
 
The similar language of 18 U.S.C. S 113, r elied upon in 
Chestaro, lends support to the conclusion that "simple 
assault" equates with traditional common-law assault. 
Specifically, Congress appeared to r ecognize a boundary 
based on contact in S 113 by dividing assaults involving 
striking or beating in S 113(a)(4) from"simple assaults" in 
S 113(a)(5).4 Rather than set up broad categories of assault 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. 18 U.S.C. S 113(a) states: 
 
       (a) Whoever, within the special maritime and territorial 
jurisdiction 
       of the United States, is guilty of an assault shall be punished as 
       follows: 
 
       (1) Assault with intent to commit murder , by imprisonment for not 
       more than twenty years. 
 
       (2) Assault with intent to commit any felony, except murder or a 
       felony under chapter 109A, by a fine under this title or 
       imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both. 
 
       (3) Assault with a dangerous weapon, with intent to do bodily harm, 
       and without just cause or excuse, by a fine under this title or 
       imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both. 
 
       (4) Assault by striking, beating, or wounding, by afine under this 
       title or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both. 
 
       (5) Simple assault, by fine under this title or imprisonment for 
not 
       more than six months, or both, or if the victim of the assault is 
an 
       individual who has not attained the age of 16 years, by fine under 
       this title or imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or both. 
 
       (6) Assault resulting in serious bodily injury, by a fine under 
this 
       title or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both. 
 
       (7) Assault resulting in substantial bodily injury to an individual 
       who has not attained the age of 16 years, by fine under this title 
or 
       imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
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and battery based on the severity of potential injury as in 
the MPC, the various provisions of S 113 call for harsher 
punishment for assaults with particular characteristics or 
results. As the authors of the MPC explained, the lack of 
intermediate grades of assault and battery at common law 
led to situations where "attempts to inflict serious bodily 
injury were not graded . . . at the level that most 
legislatures thought appropriate." MPCS 211.1, Comment 
1(c). Legislatures responded by "cr eat[ing] a range of 
personal injury offenses focusing upon the means by which 
the actor caused or threatened injury, the person upon 
whom the injury or threat was inflicted, and the 
seriousness of the injury caused or threatened." Id. In 
effect, the legislatures referr ed to by the MPC -- including, 
it seems, Congress -- used the presence of striking, 
weapons, bodily injury, particular intents, and other 
specific factors as proxies for potential severity. Remove 
these extra ingredients, and one is left with a definition for 
"simple assault" that matches the traditional notion of 
assault as an attempted battery or the placing of one in 
apprehension of immediate harm -- actions that do not 
involve contact. We, therefore,find that, under S 111(a), 
proof of actual contact is required to sustain a conviction 
for any crime beyond simple assault. 
 
The record contains no evidence of actual contact by 
McCulligan. Thus, even assuming Neder applies to this 
case, any "conviction" for non-simple assault cannot be 
salvaged -- the error would not be har mless. The question 
remains whether the sentence McCulligan r eceived beyond 
the statutory maximum for simple assault, his true offense 
of conviction, may be sustained. 
 
IV. 
 
The government contends that because McCulligan faced 
a statutory maximum sentence of at least ten years for his 
destruction of government property conviction, any error in 
sentencing him beyond the one-year maximum for his 
simple assault conviction did not affect the outcome of the 
proceedings. This argument is familiar to readers of post- 
Apprendi drug cases under 21 U.S.C. S 841. In United 
States v. Williams, 235 F.3d 858 (3d Cir. 2000), this Court 
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held, as have other Courts of Appeals, that while"the 
District Court's finding regarding the amount of drugs 
substantially increased the possible statutory maximum 
sentence under 21 U.S.C. S 841(b)(1), . . . Apprendi is not 
applicable [where] the sentence actually imposed [is] well 
under the original statutory maximum of 20 years." 
Williams, 235 F.3d at 863. 
 
This case is different from W illiams in that here the 
government contends the sentence actually imposed was 
less than the statutory maximum of a separate count of 
conviction. Although we need not decide the issue here, the 
argument that mistakes in determining the sentence on one 
count may be ignored so long as a greater sentence might 
have been imposed on another count seems to be for eclosed 
by Apprendi itself: 
 
       [T]he State has argued that even without the trial 
       judge's finding of racial bias, the judge could have 
       imposed consecutive sentences on counts 3 and 18 
       that would have produced the 12-year ter m of 
       imprisonment that Apprendi received; Appr endi's 
       actual sentence was thus within the range authorized 
       by statute for the three offenses to which he pleaded 
       guilty. . . . The constitutional question, however, is 
       whether the 12-year sentence imposed on count 18 was 
       permissible, given that it was above the 10-year 
       maximum for the offense charged in that count. The 
       finding is legally significant because it incr eased -- 
       indeed, it doubled -- the maximum range within which 
       the judge could exercise his discretion, converting what 
       otherwise was a maximum 10-year sentence on that 
       count into a minimum sentence. The sentences on 
       counts 3 and 22 have no more relevance to our 
       disposition than the dismissal of the remaining counts. 
 
Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2354 (emphasis added). The Tenth 
Circuit recently cited this language in aS 841 drug case in 
which the government argued that a 30-year sentence 
should not implicate Apprendi wher e the defendant was 
convicted of two counts, each with a 20-year maximum, 
because the sentencing court could have run the sentences 
consecutively to achieve the 30-year total. United States v. 
Jones, 235 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2000). The Jones Court 
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responded that the proper concern was "the legality of the 
sentences actually imposed, regardless of whether in the 
aggregate they are less severe than the sentences that 
could have been imposed. We will not per mit our result to 
be guided by idle speculation as to the sentence that might 
be imposed by the district court on remand." Jones, 235 
F.3d at 1238. 
 
The government argues that we need not engage in such 
"idle speculation" where the sentence necessarily would be 
the same on remand by operation of U.S.S.G.S 5G1.2(d). 
Section 5G1.2(d) states, in relevant part: 
 
       [I]f the sentence imposed on the count carrying the 
       highest statutory maximum is less than the total 
       punishment [as determined under the Guidelines], 
       then the sentence imposed on one or more of the other 
       counts shall run consecutively, but only to the extent 
       necessary to produce a combined sentence equal to the 
       total [Guidelines] punishment. 
 
S 5G1.2(d). The government presses on us several cases in 
which Courts of Appeals have let stand sentences that, 
even absent error, would have been the same as those 
which were imposed. See, e.g., United States v. Page, 232 
F.3d 536, 544-45 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Sturgis, 
238 F.3d 956, 960-61 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. 
White, 238 F.3d 537, 543 (4th Cir . 2001). 
 
This case, however, is distinguishable fr om each of those 
cases because of the simple fact that McCulligan's sentence 
would not have been the same absent the trial court's error, 
regardless of S 5G1.2(d). The sentencing courts in Page, 
Sturgis, and White each made a drug quantity 
determination, which, as noted above, constitutes a 
permissible exercise of discretion where the finding of fact 
alters the Guidelines calculation but does not r esult in a 
sentence exceeding the statutory maximum. Her e, the so- 
called "finding of fact" that increased McCulligan's 
Guideline range did not involve some variable such as drug 
quantity, but the offense of conviction itself. The District 
Court erroneously found that McCulligan had been 
convicted of a S 111(a) non-simple assault, which is 
punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year 
 
                                14 
  
and thus qualifies as a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. 
S 4B1.2. By operation of the career of fender table at 
U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1, this finding increased McCulligan's 
criminal history category to VI. Given that McCulligan 
actually was convicted of simple assault, which by virtue of 
its one-year statutory maximum does not qualify as a crime 
of violence, the District Court should have used a criminal 
history category of V.5 This correct application of the 
Guidelines would have led to a shorter total punishment 
range; thus, the reasoning of Page Stur gis, and White along 
with the language of S 5G1.2(d) upon which they are based 
does not apply. 
 
The government contends that a court may deter mine, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, the "of fense statutory 
maximum" for purposes of sentencing just as it may 
determine drug quantity. We disagr ee. Finding drug 
quantity based on evidence such as undisputed lab r esults 
is far different than pretending the jury convicted a 
defendant of one crime when actually he or she was 
convicted of another. Moreover, the Guidelines do not 
instruct judges to determine the statutory maxima of 
offenses. Rather, the Guidelines state that "Offense 
Statutory Maximum . . . refers to the maximum term of 
imprisonment authorized for the offense of conviction 
. . . ." U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1, Application Note 2. The maximum 
sentence faced by a defendant convicted of a particular 
crime is set by Congress, not "found" by courts. McCulligan 
was convicted of simple assault, and the offense statutory 
maximum is accordingly read fromS 111(a). See United 
States v. Rogers, 228 F.3d 1318, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that, on remand to correct an Apprendi error, the 
base offense level derived from the actual drug quantity 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The District Court did not examine whether McCulligan's conviction 
for destruction of government property under 18 U.S.C. S 1361 
constituted a crime of violence. The term"crime of violence" includes 
offenses that "involve[ ] conduct that presents a serious potential risk 
of 
physical injury to another." U.S.S.G.S 4B1.2(a)(2). As the District Court 
noted, however, the mix of verdicts on the various counts charged 
indicates that the jury did not believe the gover nment's assertion that 
McCulligan purposefully rammed into the deputies' vehicle. McCulligan, 
Slip. Op. at 4. 
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6. United States v. Doggett, 230 F .3d 160 (5th Cir. 2000), which the 
government cites in support of its position, is inapposite here. In 
Doggett, the defendant's base offense level was 34, derived from a 
permissible court finding of drug quantity. A three-level enhancement 
was added for two prior felony controlled substance convictions, 
resulting in a total offense level of 37. By operation of S 4B1.1, the 
defendant's criminal history category was VI. Doggett, 230 F.3d at 166 
n.3. Contrary to the government's argument, the career offender table 
did not alter the defendant's total offense level in that case. Where the 
total offense level already equals or exceeds 37, a determination of the 
offense statutory maximum is unnecessary. See U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1. 
would not change, but the effect of the "career offender" 
provision must be re-evaluated in light of the lower 
maximum sentence allowed under the offense of conviction).6 
 
While, even after Apprendi, a sentencing court may make 
certain factual determinations as it calculates the sentence 
under the Guidelines, a defendant cannot be convicted of 
one crime yet sentenced under the Guidelines as though he 
or she were convicted of some other crime. United States v. 
Knobloch, 131 F.3d 366, 373 (3d Cir . 1997)(finding that 
error in the application of the Guidelines af fected the 
defendant's "substantial right to suffer no greater an 
imposition on his liberty than the Guidelines allow."). We 
hold that the District Court, operating without a clear 
definition of "simple assault," erred in finding McCulligan's 
statutory maximum on the S 111 count to be mor e than 
one year. 
 
V. 
 
The jury charge and facts of this case both point to a 
conviction for simple assault under S 111(a). The District 
Court erroneously determined instead that McCulligan was 
convicted under the "all other" assaults pr ovision, and this 
error led to a misapplication of the Guidelines. We will 
affirm the conviction but remand for r esentencing. 
 
                                16 
  
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                17 
